On Friday 15th September 2000, approximately 4.5 billion television viewers will watch the opening ceremony of the XXVII Olympiad.  They will see the largest outdoor venue in modern Olympic history - Homebush Bay's Olympic stadium.  The 760-hectare site at Homebush Bay is located near the demographic and geographic heart of Sydney.  The area is located on the western fringes of Sydney's Central Business District, and prior to European settlement was occupied by Aboriginal people living in the tidal wetlands and thick woodlands surrounding Homebush.  Since the site's initial development, the land has undergone a multitude of uses such as a racecourse, brickworks, armaments depot and believe it or not, a State Abattoir and Meatworks.  Unfortunately, during the 1960s and 1970s, certain areas of Homebush Bay became contaminated as a result of uncontrolled dumping of household and commercial waste.  Following Sydney's successful bid for the 2000 Olympic Games, this provided the New South Wales (NSW) Government, an impetus to commence the clean up and renewal of the area.

The Olympic Planning Process 

The NSW Government realised at an early stage of the planning process that there was an important need for an overriding authority to co-ordinate and pull together the efforts of various government departments, private sector builders and developers who were involved in the construction of Olympic venues.  The OCA was created out of that need and was tasked with the responsibility for planning and managing the programmes of work to ensure they were ahead of time and within budget.  The planning for the Olympics and Paralympics took place within a framework of legislation and regulation and was required to take into consideration environmental and conservation issues for the Homebush Bay area.  One such major programme undertaken by the OCA was the construction of the Sydney 2000 Olympic stadium - Stadium Australia.  During a recent visit to Homebush Bay in Sydney, Australia, I managed to meet up with the Programme Director for Stadium Australia - Mr. Paul Gilbertson, who works for the OCA.  His portfolio included the overall management of the Sydney Super Dome construction, which will host Gymnastics and Basketball during the Games, plus surrounding show grounds and IBIS and NOVOTEL hotels and car parks.  Construction of stage 1 of Stadium Australia (Olympics mode) was officially completed in March 1999.  Following the Games, the Stadium Australia Group will operate and maintain the Stadium until 2031 under a lease agreement from OCA.  After this period, ownership will revert to the NSW Government and thus ensuring its long-term future beyond the Olympic Games.  During my interview with Paul Gilbertson, I gained an insight into how these major construction programmes were planned and managed, together with the general day-to-day challenges that were faced.  Stadium Australia In the early stages of the programme of work, consultants at KPMG produced cost models for the proposed work and submitted a report to SOCOG and OCA. SOCOG and OCA produced a brief from this information, which was made accessible to all tendering parties.  Within the brief it stressed the importance of a long-term plan for the future use of Olympic venues and that Stadium Australia would be subject to rigorous environmental guidelines during its construction process.  Three approaches were considered during the bid process, 'D & C' (Design and Construction), 'D, C & F' (Turnkey Design, Construct and Finance) and 'BOOT' (Build, Financed and Operated).  Following the completion of the tendering process, Obayashi Corporation/Multiplex Constructions were awarded the construction work adopting the BOOT approach. 

Planning the work 

The construction of Stadium Australia was to be a very large and high profile programme of work, with the timings for deliverables and Milestones being crucially important.  As a result of this, OCA ensured that during the programming of the major buildings, they were designed to match both industry capacity and to give sufficient lead-time to solve any major problems that could potentially occur.  Planning the Olympic stadium construction was broken down into 'major packages' of work, so that it could be controlled more effectively.  Additionally, this approach also helped to reduce the number of communication interfaces that could exist in a programme of this magnitude.  During the interview, Paul Gilbertson pointed out that as the programme got underway it became increasingly a challenge of communication, as it involved many parties with differing agendas who had to be managed effectively.  He made the comment that it became a real task of 'effective co-ordination', - a classic example of Programme Management to you and I.  During the planning process, the building contractors nominated major Milestones that were clearly defined and measurable at six monthly intervals. 

The agreed Milestones arrangement attracted liquidated damages for any potential losses incurred, which were refundable if the contractor 'caught up' at future planned Milestones. During the life of these large construction programmes, OCA were not responsible for the day-to-day construction work and therefore did not have direct control over resourcing and progress.  This was dealt with by the building contractors at project plan level, but with the lower level plans being submitted on a regular basis to the OCA programme team, to enable the overall programme plan to be updated.  Furthermore, with regard to the Programme/Project Management aspects, Paul Gilbertson commented that it took more OCA personnel to MANAGE the programme, than was initially envisaged at Initiation Stage.  During the programming process, the building contractors provided lower level linked Gantt Charts to represent their individual 'packages of work' using Microsoft Project and submitted these to the OCA programme team.  It was found that because of the level and nature of the task dependencies, these could not be regarded as being 'rock solid' and did become somewhat difficult to model at this detailed project level.  Once the individual package plans had been received from the building contractors, PRIMAVERA was then used to pull all the individual contractor plans into one overall programme plan, to be assessed by the OCA team for any potential impact to the overall programme. 

Lessons learnt 

Numerous lessons were learnt from these high profile construction programmes.  Firstly, as part of the agreement with the building contractors, OCA had the option to remove the building contractor at any time during the construction process.  This in itself acted as a very strong management tool.  Secondly, an Advisory Committee was established, which clearly helped resolve any important issues that occurred during the programme of work and in turn helped to reduce the risk of these issues delaying the programme - time being of great importance to this particular programme of work.  Thirdly, possessing clearly identified and measurable Milestones, with potential liquidated damages applied to any Milestones that delivered late, clearly helped to focus the building contractors and to provide a powerful management tool to OCA. 

Pride

During the interview, you get a great sense of Paul Gilbertson's pride in what has been achieved at Homebush Bay.  The facts and figures bear this out.  The construction of Stadium Australia began in September 1996 with a final development cost of A$ 690 million (£460m): three months earlier than proposed in Sydney's Games bid and eighteen months before the commencement of the Games themselves.  The SOCOG Committee has been widely criticised by the parochial media for not sufficiently favouring the host country in its allocation of tickets.  This has been one criticism amongst a number that has accompanied the media hype, during the publicity build-up to the Games.  Unlike SOCOG, who recently have been facing allegations of bribery and corruption in the world press, OCA seem to have quietly gone about their business and delivered what they were tasked to deliver within time and budget.  Naturally, parallels can be drawn with our own Millennium Dome in London, which seems to be a good example of how not to manage a high profile programme of work.  At an estimated cost of £800 million, continual press reports of Milestones not being met, requirements not signed off, lack of general communication and co-ordination with budgets constantly being revised after work has commenced - a recipe for disaster.  Furthermore, the question does need to be asked, as to whether Australians will get more long term value for money out of Stadium Australia, when compared with our own Millennium Dome - we will all have to wait and see…